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5Introduction
1 Introduction




Numerous	 scientific	 studies	 demonstrate	 that	 the	 structure	 of	 labor	 market	 institutions	 plays	
a	 central	 role	 in	 the	 development	 of	 inequality	 (Dustmann	 et	 al.	 2009,	 Di	Nardo	 et	 al.	 1996).	
Furthermore,	 the	 scientific	 literature	 refers	 regularly	 to	 the	 role	 of	 technological	 change	 as	
a	 potential	 driver	 of	wage	 inequality	 (Acemoglu	 2002).	 It	was	 long	 thought	 that	 technological	
progress	is	skill-biased	and	therefore	has	a	different	impact	on	employment	demand	for	highly-




























When	we	discuss	the	structure of wage inequality,	we	are	distinguishing	the	contribution	
of	individual	factors	to	wage	inequality.
When	we	speak	of	the	dynamics of wage inequality,	we	are	referring	to	the	development	
of	inequality	in	general,	as	well	as	the	development	of	individual	explanatory	factors	in	
particular	over	time.
Our	 objective	 in	 this	 study	 is	 to	 create	 a	 current,	 explicit	 picture	 of	 the	 development	 of	wage	
inequality	in	Germany.	In	addition,	we	empirically	examine	in	detail	the	correlation	between	the	
international	engagement	of	companies	and	the	trajectory	of	wage	inequality	in	Germany.	With	
this	 analysis,	we	 aim	 to	 produce	 a	well-founded	 assessment	 of	 the	 importance	 of	 the	 growing	




being	 studied	 and	 the	 data	 used.	 Section	 3	 has	 a	 detailed	 analysis	 of	 the	 structure	 of	 wage	
inequality,	 including	 an	 analysis	 of	 individual	 regions	 and	 industries,	 as	 well	 as	 inequality	
analyzed	 according	 to	 demographic	 variables.	 In	 Section	 4,	we	 use	 variance	 decomposition	 to	
examine	which	group	reports	the	largest	increase	in	inequality.	In	Section	5,	we	turn	to	the	effect	
of	company	characteristics	and	discuss	in	particular	the	role	of	collective	bargaining	agreements	
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2 Subject overview and data used 
In	 order	 to	 create	 the	most	 comprehensive,	 robust	 and	 up-to-date	 picture	 of	 the	 inequality	 in	
Germany	 as	 possible,	 we	 are	 drawing	 on	 data	 sources	 for	 this	 study	 that	 have	 already	 been	
established	in	the	academic	literature	for	this	field	(Dustmann	et	al.	2009,	Card	et	al.	2013).	Our	















In	 addition	 to	 different	 types	 of	 income,	 a	 distinction	 can	be	made	with	 respect	 to	 the	
individual	 income	approach	and	 the	household	 income	approach.	The	 income	situation	
of	 households	 is	 made	 comparable	 –	 consistently	 with	 international	 standards	 –	 by	
converting	the	total	income	of	a	household	into	equivalized	incomes.	For	more	information,	
see	OECD	(2011).
Our	analyses	of	 the	structure	and	dynamics	of	 inequality	are	 thus	based	on	gross	wages	 from	
workers	covered	by	social	security,	in	other	words,	wages	before	deduction	of	taxes	and	any	transfer	
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We	would	 like	 to	note	here	 that	–	as	 is	common	 in	 the	academic	 literature	–	we	are	 referring	
to	 wage	 developments	 for	 full-time	 workers	 (see	 also	 Fitzenberger	 2012).2	 Accordingly,	 we	
only	 examine	 those	 effects	 on	 wage	 inequality	 that	 result	 from	 changes	 in	 the	 remuneration	
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3 The trend in German wage inequality
In	 recent	 decades,	 inequality	 has	 risen	 in	many	 developed	 economies	 (Katz	 and	 Autor	 1999,	
Machin	 and	 Van	 Reenen	 2008,	 OECD	 2011).	 For	 a	 long	 time	 it	 was	 the	 prevailing	 opinion	
among	economists	 that	no	 comparable	 rise	 in	wage	 inequality	had	 occurred	 in	Germany.	 This	
was	often	interpreted	as	a	sign	of	the	inflexibility	of	the	German	labor	market	and	one	cause	of	
its	 comparatively	high	unemployment	 (Prasad	2004).	More	 recent	 studies,	 however,	 show	 that	
inequality	has	also	increased	noticeably	in	Germany	(e.g.	Dustmann	et	al.	2009,	Card	et	al.	2013).
The	Gini	coefficient	is	a	commonly	used	measure	for	inequality.	It	can	take	values	between	zero	





Figure 1: Development of wage inequality in Germany
Source: Own calculations based on SIAB. Through 1991 the data refers to West Germany, thereafter to all of Germany. The underlying sample includes 
full-time employees between the ages of 18 to 65 years.































































The trend in German wage inequality
Figure	1	shows	the	development	of	 inequality	for	Germany	using	the	standard	deviation	of	 log	
real	wages	and	the	Gini	coefficient.4	Both	measures	of	 inequality	reflect	 the	same	trend.	From	





15	years	 (from	1996	to	2010).	Comparisons	 to	other	national	economies	revealed	 that	 this	was	
indeed	 a	 considerable	 increase.	 For	 example,	 the	Anglo-Saxon	 economies	 (USA,	Great	 Britain,	
Canada	–	economies	that	are	typically	considered	very	unequal	and	associated	with	the	greatest	
increases	–	only	incurred	a	growth	of	6	to	8	log	percentage	points	from	1985	to	2005.	As	such,	







Table 1: Wage inequality in Anglo-Saxon economies and Germany
 Year Standard deviation Year Standard deviation
USA* 1985 0.60 Canada 1985 0.62
1990 0.62 1990 0.62
1995 0.66 1995 0.62
2000 0.66 2000 0.67
2005 0.68 2005 0.68
Great Britain 1985 0.50 Germany** 1985 0.45
1990 0.55 1990 0.46
1995 0.55 1995 0.46
2000 0.57 2000 0.50
2005 0.56 2005 0.54
    2010 0.57
*The data refers exclusively to men. 
**Up to and including 1990, the data refers solely to West Germany; afterward to all of Germany.
Note: The data comes from the following sources: USA: Heathcote et al. (2010); Great Britain: Blundell et al. (2010); 
Canada: Brzozowski et al. (2010); Germany: own calculations.
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Figure	2	shows	the	wage	development	at	different	percentiles	of	the	wage	distribution	indexed	
for	the	year	1992.6	The	median	income7	of	full-time	workers	rose	slightly	from	1992	to	the	early	















7	 	The	median,	also	called	the	50th	percentile,	describes	 the	value	of	 the	 income	distribution	that	separates	 the	better	earning	





Figure 2: Indexed development of real wages 
Source: Own calculations based on SIAB. The data refers to all of Germany. The underlying sample in-cludes full-time employees between the ages of 
18 to 65 years. All real wages were indexed to the year 1992 (1992=100). Note: The wage information in the original data is cut off at the social 
security contribution limit. Using well-established imputation procedures, we estimate the actual wages for these cases. Per year, between 9 and 14 
percent of the values are cut off, so that the 80th percentile is not affected.
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Figure 3: Trend in residual wage inequality
Source: Own calculations based on SIAB. Through 1991 the data refers to West Germany, thereafter to all of Germany. The underlying sample includes 
full-time employees between the ages of 18 to 65 years. We calculate residual inequality by running yearly regressions of log real wages on indicator 
variables of three education groups (low, medium, high), ﬁve age groups (18–25, 26–35, 36–45, 46–55, 56–65), their interaction terms and indicator 
variables for gender and West Germany.
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12	 	The	 free	 trade	agreement	of	 the	EU	with	Poland,	Hungary,	Czech	Republic,	Slovakia,	Bulgaria	and	Rumania	came	 into	 force	
during	the	mid	to	late	1990s.
Figure 4: Macroeconomic events
Source: Own calculations based on SIAB. Shown is the standard deviation of log real wages for West Germany (1985 to 2010) and all of Germany 
(1992 to 2010). The underlying sample includes full-time employees between the ages of 18 to 65 years. Unemployment rate data is from the Federal 
Employ-ment Agency.
Standard deviation of log real wages (all of Germany)
Standard deviation of log real wages (only West Germany)













































































2) Trade agreement with Eastern European countries
1) German reuniﬁcation/fall of the Iron Curtain
3) Labor market reform promoting growth and employment
5) Hartz reforms
4) China joins WTO


























was	 a	 significant	 increase	 in	 the	 unemployment	 rate.	 The	 subsequent	 general	 economic	
recession	and	the	continued	rise	in	the	unemployment	rate	led	to	the	labor	market	reforms	
in	1996	“to	promote	growth	and	employment.”	As	part	of	this	law,	the	duration	of	temporary	
contracts	 was	 increased	 from	 one	 to	 two	 years,	 the	 company	 size	 for	 protection	 against	
dismissal	 rose	 from	 five	 to	 ten	 employees,	 and	 sick	 leave	 payments	 fell	 from	 100	 to	 80	
percent.	These	measures	to	improve	flexibility	at	the	employer	level	were	accompanied	by	
a	loosening	of	collective	bargaining	agreements	as	cited	by	Dustmann	et	al.	(2014).13	In	the	
aftermath	of	 this	 liberalization,	 the	unemployment	 rate	declined,	while	 at	 the	 same	 time	
the	dispersion	of	wages	increased.	
With	 the	 economic	 downturn	 in	 2001,	 pressure	 for	 labor	market	 reform	 again	 increased.	 This	
occurred	at	the	same	time	as	China’s	entry	into	the	WTO.	The	Hartz	reforms	were	subsequently	
implemented	in	2003,	2004	and	2005,	which	restructured	employment	services	and	were	linked	










The trend in German wage inequality
An	 analysis	 of	 individual	 federal	 states	 shows	 that	 Berlin	 recorded	 the	 sharpest	 rise	 in	 wage	
inequality	 in	 the	 period	 from	1992	 to	 2010	 (Figure	 6).	 A	 similar	 trend	 is	 found	 for	Hamburg,	
while	a	high	 level	of	wage	 inequality	 is	also	present	 in	Bremen,	with	a	sharp	rise	 in	 the	mid-
2000s.	Regarding	the	more	populous	federal	states,	the	wage	dispersion	in	Hesse	is	much	greater	
than	in	other	states.	If	we	look	at	the	development	of	wage	inequality	in	various	sectors	of	the	




Figure 5: Trend in inequality in East and West Germany
Source: Own calculations based on SIAB. The underlying sample includes full-time employees between the ages of 18 to 65 years separately by East 
and West Germany.
Standard deviation West Gini Index West









































































The trend in German wage inequality
Figure 6: Trend in inequality by federal state 
Source: Own calculations based on SIAB. The underlying sample includes full-time employees between the ages of 18 to 65 years by federal state.
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The trend in German wage inequality
3.4 Trend in wage inequality across demographic variables
Besides	the	regional	and	industry-specific	analysis	of	wage	inequality,	it	is	also	interesting	how	
wage	inequality	has	developed	across	demographic	variables	such	as	gender	or	education.	









Figure 7: Total and residual wage inequality in men and women 
a) Men
Source: Own calculations based on SIAB. Through 1991 the data refers to West Germany, thereafter to all of Germany. The underlying sample includes 
full-time employees between the ages of 18 to 65 years, separately for men and women. Residual inequality is calculated by running yearly 
regressions of log real wages on indicator variables of three educational groups (low, medium, high), ﬁve age groups (18–25, 26–35, 36–45, 46–55, 
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Figure 7: Total and residual wage inequality in men and women 
a) Men
Source: Own calculations based on SIAB. Through 1991 the data refers to West Germany, thereafter to all of Germany. The underlying sample includes 
full-time employees between the ages of 18 to 65 years, separately for men and women. Residual inequality is calculated by running yearly 
regressions of log real wages on indicator variables of three educational groups (low, medium, high), ﬁve age groups (18–25, 26–35, 36–45, 46–55, 
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The trend in German wage inequality
The	 lowest	 level	 of	 wage	 inequality	 was	 found	 among	 low-skilled	 workers.	 However,	 wage	
dispersion	increased	more	sharply	in	this	group	starting	in	the	mid	1990s	than	among	medium-





A	 corresponding	 analysis	 can	 be	 done	 using	 the	 variable	 of	 nationality	 (Figure	 9).	 Here	 we	
differentiate	 between	German	 and	 non-German	 employees.	We	 first	 look	 at	 the	 trend	 in	wage	











Figure 8: Inequality across educational groups 
Source: Own calculations based on SIAB. Data refers to all of Germany. The underlying sample includes full-time employees between the ages of 18 to 
65 years, separated by level of education. In the speci-ﬁcation shown, we look at the trend for “unconditional” inequality by group. In other 
speciﬁcations, we control for age group, gender and region. The resulting structure is similar.





































Figure 9: Inequality by citizenship
Source: See comments to Figure 8. Speciﬁcation (A) reﬂects the “unconditional” trend in inequality per group; in speciﬁcation (B), we control for age 
group, education group, gender and region.





















4 Analysis of wage variance 





In	 Panel	 I,	 all	 companies	 are	 identical,	 so	 that	 the	 variance	 in	wages	within	 each	 company	 is	
the	 same	 as	 the	 overall	 variance	 of	 the	 economy.	Accordingly,	 the	 overall	 variance	 is	 entirely	
explained	by	the	dispersion	within	companies.	In	Panel	II,	all	companies	are	different,	and	the	
specific	variance	within	companies	 is	very	small.	The	overall	variance	is	 thus	the	result	of	 the	
wage	dispersion	within	every	company	and	the	differences	in	the	individual	mean	values	between	
the	different	companies.
Figure 10: Wage distribution within and between companies

































First	 of	 all,	 as	we	observe	 the	decomposition	across	 skill	 groups	 it	becomes	apparent	 that	 the	
dispersion	between	skill	groups	has	increased	by	37	percent,	but	the	major	share	of	the	rise	in	
total	wage	 inequality	has	 taken	place	within	age	and	education	groups	 (63	percent).	A	similar	
pattern	 results	 for	 occupational	 groups.	45	percent	 of	 the	 total	 rise	 in	wage	 inequality	 can	be	
traced	to	the	dispersion	between	occupational	groups,	while	55	percent	of	the	rise	is	explained	by	
an	increase	in	the	dispersion	within	occupational	groups.
Another	picture	 results,	however,	 if	we	 look	at	 the	company	component.	Here	 the	portion	 that	
reflects	 the	 variance	between	businesses	 is	 clearly	 larger:	Nearly	 three-quarters	 of	 the	 rise	 in	
inequality	during	the	period	observed	has	taken	place	between	companies,	and	only	one	quarter	










Table 2: Variance decomposition: inequality trends
2000 Share of 
variance 
2010 Share of 
variance 
Change Share of 
change 
Total variance 0.232 0.301 0.069
Between skill groups 0.044 19 0.070 23 0.026 37
Within skill groups 0.187 81 0.231 77 0.043 63
Between occupational groups 0.081 35 0.112 37 0.031 45
Within occupational groups 0.151 65 0.189 63 0.038 55
Between companies 0.141 61 0.192 64 0.051 74
Within companies 0.090 39 0.108 36 0.018 26
Source: Own calculations based on SIAB and LIAB. The underlying sample includes full-time employees between the ages of 
18 to 65 years in all of Germany. Skill groups result from the interaction of five age and three education groups. Using the 
1988 occupations classification, we distinguish 343 different occupational groups.
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5 The role of company characteristics
Which	company	characteristics	 are	 relevant	 for	 the	 rise	 in	wage	 inequality	 in	Germany	and	can	




5.1 Trends in collective bargaining











agreements;	 in	 2010	 it	was	 only	 50	 percent.	 The	 share	 of	 employees	 tied	 to	 such	 agreements	
sank	during	this	period	from	12	to	10	percent.19	In	addition	to	this	general	decline	of	collective	
bargaining	agreements,	escape	and	hardship	clauses	have	become	more	common	since	the	mid-
1990s,	 giving	 greater	 bargaining	 leeway	 to	 even	 those	 companies	 tied	 to	 collective	 bargaining	
agreements	(Brändle	et	al.	2011,	Bispinck	et	al.	2010).	
Overall,	 therefore,	 the	 importance	 of	 collective	 bargaining	 agreements	 has	 decreased	 sharply.	
Dustmann	et	al.	(2014)	call	this	process	of	decentralization	of	wage	bargaining	from	the	industry	





The role of company characteristics
5.2 The role of collective agreements for wage payments 
As	 existing	 studies	 show,	 collective	 bargaining	 agreements	 can	 affect	 the	 average	 wage	 level	
of	 covered	 employment	 relationships	 relative	 to	uncovered	 relationships	 (Card	1996).	 Through	
this	channel,	wage	inequality	is	influenced	by	the	different	average	wages	between	employment	
relationships	secured	by	a	collective	bargaining	agreement	and	those	that	are	not.	 In	addition,	
collective	 wage	 agreements	 reduce	 the	 dispersion	 of	 wages	 within	 the	 group	 of	 covered	




wage	 regressions	 in	 which	 we	 ran	 for	 each	 year	 a	 separate	 regression	 of	 the	 log	 real	 wages	
on	 individual	 characteristics	 and	 other	 indicator	 variables	 for	 region,	 industry	 and	 nationality	
(Specification	 A).	 By	 doing	 this,	 the	 wage	 premium	 indicates	 the	 percentage	 supplement	 to	
the	wages	 of	 a	 comparable	 employee	 in	 a	 company	without	 a	 collective	 agreement.	 This	wage	
supplement	from	collective	agreements	in	the	period	from	1996	to	2010	lies	between	eight	and	19	
percent	and	shows	a	clear	rise	since	1999	(Figure	11).	
Table 3: Trends in collective bargaining agreements in Germany





















1996 49 11 60 70 12 82
1997 49 11 60 68 14 82
1998 47 5 52 67 9 76
1999 43 4 47 64 9 73
2000 44 3 47 63 8 70
2001 43 4 47 60 8 68
2002 43 3 45 60 8 68
2003 41 3 45 60 9 69
2004 41 3 43 59 8 67
2005 38 3 41 57 9 66
2006 37 3 40 55 10 65
2007 35 3 38 55 9 64
2008 34 3 37 53 10 62
2009 35 4 39 52 11 63
2010 33 3 35 52 10 62
Source: Own calculations based on LIAB. The underlying sample includes all branches of the economy for all of Germany. 
Weighting factors are considered.
26
The role of company characteristics
If	we	additionally	 control	 for	 other	 company	 characteristics	 (sales	 (Specification	B),	 number	 of	
employees	(Specification	C)),	the	premium	is	much	lower	(between	one	and	ten	percent)	but	still	
rose	 during	 the	 period.	 The	 lower	wage	 premium	may	 be	 partially	 due	 to	 the	 fact	 that	 larger	




5.3 Trends in exports
While	the	importance	of	collective	bargaining	has	noticeably	declined	in	German	companies	over	






by	2010	nearly	30	percent	did	so.	But	not	only	has	 the	number	of	exporting	companies	 in	 the	
20	 	Addison	 et	 al.	 (2014)	 is	 a	 current	 study	 that	 looks	 at	 the	 wage	 premium	 in	 Germany	 and	 differentiates	 between	 industry	
agreements	and	company-level	agreements.
Figure 11: Trend in the collective bargaining premium
Source: Own calculations based on LIAB. The sample includes male full-time employees from the man-ufacturing sector. The calculations of the 
premiums below are based on this sample (men, manufacturing sector). First, because the trends in collective agreements and export participation 
hold especially in the manufacturing sector, and second, in order to be comparable with other studies, like Baumgarten (2013), which used the same 
dataset. Weighting factors are taken into account. Statistical signiﬁcance: Until 1999 (Speciﬁcations B and C), all values were signiﬁcantly different 
from zero at least to the ﬁve percent level.
















The role of company characteristics
manufacturing	industry	increased	during	the	period	observed	–	so	has	the	export	intensity,	i.e.,	
the	average	share	of	sales	made	abroad	(Figure	12).
Furthermore,	 exporting	companies	are	 important	employers.	Figure	13	shows	 that	about	every	
third	 employee	 works	 in	 a	 company	 that	 makes	 some	 portion	 of	 its	 revenue	 abroad.	 In	 the	
manufacturing	 sector,	 the	 employment	 share	 of	 exporting	 companies	 is	more	 than	70	percent	
(2010).
Figure 12: The importance of exporters
Source: Own calculations based on LIAB. The underlying sample covers the manufacturing sector. Weighting factors are considered.











Figure 13: Share of exporting companies, share of employment
Source: Own calculations based on LIAB. Weighting factors are considered
share of employees of exporting companies in all industry sectors share of exporting companies in all industries
















The role of company characteristics
5.4 The role of exports for wages 
In	 current	 theoretical	 works,	 economists	 (Helpman	 et	 al.	 2010,	 Egger	 and	 Kreikemeier	 2009,	
Felbermayr	 et	 al.	 2014),	 argue	 that	 the	 connection	 between	 global	 trade	 and	wage	 inequality	
runs	via	the	wage	difference	between	exporting	and	non-exporting	companies.	According	to	this,	










that	 they	 cannot	 differentiate	whether	 higher	wages	 at	 exporters	 reflect	 a	 higher	 quality	 of	
workers	or	comparable	workers	earn	more	if	they	are	hired	by	an	exporting	company.	To	make	
this	 determination,	 there	 must	 be	 data	 about	 the	 companies	 and	 their	 employees:	 Munch	






real	wages	 on	 an	 indicator	 variable	 for	 the	 export	 status	 of	 the	 company.	We	 control	 for	 both	
demographic	 characteristics	 (age	 group,	 educational	 group,	 their	 interaction)	 as	 well	 as	 for	
the	 corresponding	 industrial	 sector	 and	 region.	 Figure	 14	 shows	 the	 trend	 for	 exporter	 wage	
premiums.	From	1999	to	2007,	the	premium	rose	almost	continuously,	from	eleven	to	16	percent,	
before	it	dropped	in	2008	and	then	reached	15	percent	again	in	2010.	





with	trade	theoretical	 literature	based	on	the	model	by	Melitz	(2003).	 It	suggests	that	 it	 is	 the	
productive	companies	that	can	afford	to	enter	export	markets.	The	prospect	of	big	sales	markets	
21	 	There	is	only	very	limited	comparability	of	the	calculated	exporter	wage	premiums	across	different	studies	and	countries.	The	




The role of company characteristics
lets	companies	grow	and	makes	paying	higher	wages	seem	profitable.	The	fact	that	international	
trade	 changes	 the	 size	 distribution	 of	 companies	 is	 why	 the	 effect	 between	 trade	 and	 wage	
premium	occurs	mainly	through	company	size.
A	more	 extensive	 analysis	 of	 the	 exporter	 wage	 premium	 shows	 that	 the	 premiums	 are	 also	












Figure 14: Trend for the exporter wage premium
Source: Own calculations based on LIAB. The underlying sample includes male full-time employees in companies in the manufacturing sector. The 
values of the exporter wage premium result from year-speciﬁc regressions in which the log real wages are regressed on individual characteristics, 
indicator variables of the industrial sector and the federal states (Speciﬁcation A), revenue (Speciﬁcation B) and employment (Speciﬁcation C). 
Weighting factors are considered. Statistical signiﬁcance: Except for the values from 1997 to 2002 and 2009 of Speciﬁcation B, all values are 
signiﬁcantly different from zero to at least the ﬁve percent level.





















The role of company characteristics
5.5 The role of imports for wages 
Aside	 from	 the	steep	 rise	 in	exports,	German	companies	have	also	significantly	 increased	 their	
imports.	Over	the	period	between	2000	and	2010,	Germany’s	imports	grew	by	nearly	50	percent	
(Federal	 Statistical	 Office,	 2014).	 Just	 how	 strongly	 companies’	 import	 behavior	 affects	 wages	
cannot	 be	 clearly	 derived	 from	 economic	 theory.	 A	 potential	 decrease	 in	wages	 due	 to	 greater	




import	 and	 export	 and	 companies	 that	 are	 exclusively	 active	 on	 the	 domestic	market	 (see	 also	
Baumgarten	2013).	Companies	that	both	import	as	well	as	export	have	been	demonstrated	to	pay	
the	highest	wages.	
Figure 15: Trend of the exporter wage premium by destination market
Source: Own calculations based on LIAB. The underlying sample includes male full-time employees from companies in the manufacturing sector. The 
values of the exporter wage premium result from year-speciﬁc regressions in which the log real are is regressed on individual characteristics as well 
as on indicator variables of the industrial sector and the federal state. Weighting factors are considered. Statistical signiﬁcance: except for the value 
for “new EU members” in 2004, all values are signiﬁcantly different from zero at least to the ﬁve percent level. 
only currency union only other foreign countries
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importing	or	exporting	companies.	Table	4	shows	 the	wage	premiums	 for	 the	different	 types	of	
trade.
25	 	Kohler	 (2004)	 and	 Grossman	 and	 Rossi-Hansberg	 (2008)	 show,	 for	 example,	 the	 positive	 productivity	 effects	 for	 domestic	
companies	of	outsourcing	production	abroad.
Table 4: Wage premium by type of trade 
Year Exporter Importer Exporter and Importer
1999 0.07*** 0.10*** 0.13***
2001 0.08*** 0.09*** 0.12***
2003 0.11*** 0.12*** 0.16***
*** shows significance at the one percent level. The underlying sample consists of male full-time employees from companies 
in the manufacturing sector. Only for 1999, 2001 and 2003 does the dataset have information available on the import 
activity of companies. For those years, we regress log real wages on the trade type variable, individual characteristics and 
indicator variables for the industrial sector and federal state. Weighting factors are considered.
Source: Own calculations based on LIAB.
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decline	 of	 collective	bargaining	 agreements	has	made	an	 important	 contribution	 to	 the	 rise	 in	
wage	inequality.	To	the	extent	that	the	decline	in	collective	agreements	could	be	at	least	partially	
due	to	structural	economic	changes,	where	industries	with	(traditionally)	low	collective	bargaining	
coverage	 have	 become	 relatively	more	 important,	 this	 univariate	 “collective	 bargaining	 effect”	
would	partially	 include	a	 “sector	effect”	and	would	 thus	possibly	be	overestimated.	 In	order	 to	
distinguish	these	two	potential	influences	from	each	other,	it	is	therefore	important	to	integrate	
the	 industrial	sector	as	well	as	 the	 form	of	wage	negotiation	 in	 the	analysis.	The	same	applies	
analogously	to	other	explanatory	factors.	
In	addition,	it	is	crucial	to	be	able	to	distinguish	the	“wage	structure	effect”	from	the	“composition	
effect.”	 The	 wage	 structure	 effect	 can	 be	 understood	 as	 a	 “price	 effect,”	 and	 the	 composition	
effect	 as	 a	 “quantity	 effect.”	These	are	based	on	 the	 consideration	 that	 individual	 explanatory	
factors	can	have	an	influence	on	the	dynamic	of	wage	inequality	through	two	different	channels.	
A	possible	positive	contribution	by	education	to	 the	rise	 in	wage	 inequality	may	be	due	to	 the	
fact	that	the	share	of	highly	skilled	employees	(with	a	possible	constant	return	on	education)	has	
increased	over	time	(composition	effect).	This	is	the	case,	for	example,	when	wage	dispersion	is	
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Finally,	 it	 is	 likewise	 of	 great	 interest	 to	 quantify	 the	 influence	 of	 the	 individual	 explanatory	
factors	 at	 different	 parts	 of	 the	wage	 distribution.	 A	 decline	 in	 collective	 bargaining	 coverage	
may,	 for	example,	have	a	different	 influence	on	the	lower	end	of	 the	wage	distribution	than	on	
the	upper	tail.	In	the	following	section,	we	provide	a	quick	sketch	of	a	model	that	satisfies	these	
requirements.
6.1 Methodological aspects 
In	order	 to	determine	 the	explanatory	contribution	of	different	 factors	 to	 the	dynamic	of	wage	








The	decomposition	analysis	provides	valuable	clues	 to	 the	meaning	of	 the	various	explanatory	





In	 addition,	 the	 identified	 wage	 structure	 effects	 reflect	 both	 the	 changed	 wage	 differentials	
between	 different	 groups	 (explained	 inequality)	 as	 well	 as	 a	 changed	wage	 inequality	 within	
groups	(residual	wage	inequality).	A	sharp	distinction	between	explained	and	residual	inequality,	
as	 we	 have	 so	 far	 examined	 them	 in	 the	 framework	 of	 this	 study,	 is	 thus	 not	 possible	 using	
this	method.	 Through	 this	 decomposition	 analysis,	 on	 the	 other	 hand,	 it	 becomes	 clear	which	
groups	have	experienced	a	shift	in	the	underlying	compositional	structure	that	affects	the	wage	
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Since	 changes	 in	 quantities	 (composition)	 are	 contemplated	 in	 isolation	 from	 the	 changes	 in	
prices	(wage	structure),	general	equilibrium	effects	are	also	ignored	in	this	analysis.	This	means,	






In	 our	 analysis	we	 consider	 the	 following	 individual	 and	 company-specific	 explanatory	 factors	
to	provide	the	most	precise	picture	of	the	drivers	of	wage	inequality.	At	the	individual	level,	we	
differentiate	between	 three	education	groups,	 five	age	 categories	 and	more	 than	300	different	
occupational	 groups.	 At	 the	 company	 level,	 we	 look	 at	 collective	 bargaining	 agreements	 by	
checking	for	three	different	forms	of	wage	setting	(industry	collective	agreement,	company-level	
agreement	 or	 no	 collective	 agreement),	 recording	 the	 international	 engagement	 of	 companies	
by	checking	the	export	status	of	individual	businesses	and	taking	into	account	potential	effects	




male	employees	in	the	manufacturing	sector.	The	manufacturing	sector	 is	of	special	 interest	 in	
this	respect	because	two	of	the	explanatory	factors	considered,	(decline	of)	collective	bargaining	
and	international	trade,	are	of	outstanding	importance	to	this	sector.	The	limitation	to	men,	like	
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distribution	 range.	 Furthermore,	 we	 recognize	 that	 the	 increase	 in	 inequality	 is	 connected	

























interesting	 overall	 conclusions	 can	 be	 drawn	 from	 the	 derived	 results	 on	 the	 development	 of	
the	 relative	wage	 structure	 of	 the	 individual	 explanatory	 factors	 and	 their	 significance	 for	 the	
increase	in	wage	inequality.	For	example,	it	becomes	clear	that	changes	in	the	wage	structure	for	
employment	relationships	covered	by	collective	bargaining	agreements	during	the	study	period	
had	a	negative	 effect	 on	 equality	 and	 can	be	 associated	with	 a	 rise	 in	 inequality	 of	 almost	11	
log	percentage	points.	This	encompasses	an	increase	in	both	the	collective	bargaining	premium	





34	 In	 our	 analysis,	 the	 base	 category	 is	 defined	 through	 the	 following	 categories:	 education	 –	 average	 qualification	 levels;	 age	











Thus	 far	our	decomposition	analysis	has	underscored	 the	significance	of	 traditional	 factors	 for	
increasing	wage	inequality:	Changes	in	collective	bargaining	agreements	and	the	corresponding	
wage	 structure,	 as	 well	 as	 changes	 in	 the	 education	 and	 age	 structure	 for	 workers	 and	 their	
individual	 wages	 all	 influence	 the	 development	 of	 wage	 inequality.	 We	 could	 not	 identify	 a	
statistically	significant	influence	on	the	increase	in	wage	inequality	for	either	our	export	channel	
36	 In	fact,	our	data	confirms	that	the	wage	dispersion	within	the	base	group	increased	the	most.
Figure 16: Decomposition results in detail, 1996–2010
Source: LIAB. The sample includes men between the ages of 18 and 65 employed full-time in the ma-nufacturing industry. Weighting factors are 
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or	the	technological	change	factor.	However,	it	is	conceivable	that	the	relatively	long	period	of	time	
under	consideration	 (from	1996	to	2010)	might	conceal	new	and	potentially	 interesting	trends.	
For	 that	 reason,	we	conducted	a	decomposition	analyses	 for	 two	 time	segments.	We	separated	













structure	 (and	not	 to	 changed	composition	effects).	While	 changes	 in	 the	 collective	bargaining	
premium	or	the	associated	wage	structure	only	promoted	inequality	during	the	first	subperiod,	
no	 influence	could	be	 identified	 in	 the	second	subperiod.	By	contrast,	 the	results	 indicate	 that	
a	change	 in	 the	exporter	wage	premium	had	an	 inequality-promoting	effect	during	 the	second	
time	period,	but	not	 in	 the	 first.	Therefore,	 these	 results	point	 toward	 the	growing	 importance	
of	companies’	export	status	 for	 the	development	of	wage	 inequality	 in	Germany.	One	potential	
approach	 for	explaining	 this	change	 is	 that	wage	 flexibility	has	 increased	sharply	 in	Germany	
due	to	the	documented	decline	of	(industry)	collective	bargaining	agreements.	As	such,	company	
characteristics	relevant	to	business	success,	such	as	export	status,	have	a	stronger	effect	on	paid	
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Figure 17: Detailed results of the decomposition analysis, 1996–2003, 
2003–2010 
Source: LIAB. The underlying sample includes full-time male employees between the ages of 18 to 65 years who are employed in the manufacturing 
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1996	and	2010.	The	decline	of	 collective	bargaining	agreements	plays	 the	most	 important	 role	
here.	 It	 particularly	 increases	 inequality	 in	 the	 lower	 range	 of	wage	 distribution	 and	 explains	
around	43	percent	of	the	entire	increase	during	the	period	of	time	in	question.	It	is	accompanied	


















of	 wage	 inequality	 within	 the	 export	 channel	 considered	 in	 this	 analysis.	 Table	 5	 provides	 a	
summary	of	the	results.
38	 	These	changes	in	the	wage	structure	are	connected	to	around	80	percent	of	the	total	increase.	It	becomes	clear	that	changes	
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In	the	next	section	we	will	conduct	a	supplementary	analysis	in	which	we	consider	the	correlation	
between	 international	 trade	 and	 inequality	 at	 an	 aggregated	 level.	 We	 will	 measure	 sectoral	
openness	using	data	 that	 assesses	added	value	and	 therefore	are	also	 taking	 into	account	 the	
interdependence	 structures	 within	 the	 national	 economy.	 Unlike	 the	 analysis	 in	 this	 section,	
an	 examination	 at	 the	 aggregated	 sectoral	 level	 also	 considers	 possible	 indirect	 effects	 from	






Table 5: Central results of the decomposition analysis
Composition effect The share of jobs not covered by collective bargaining is increasing, which increases inequality. This 
affects the lower range of wage distribution.
The share of highly skilled and older employees is rising. Since the wage differential within both of 
these groups is high, this increases inequality. This affects the upper range of the wage distribution.
Wage structure 
effect
The wage structure effect related to collective bargaining promotes inequality. However, this only 
occurs during the first subperiod (1996-2003). This affects the lower range of wage distribution.
The return on education for the highly-skilled relative to the medium-skilled has increased. 
Moreover, the wage gap within the highly-skilled group has increased. Both of these increase 
inequality. This affects the upper range of the wage distribution.
The exporter wage structure effect promotes inequality in the second subperiod (2003-2010).
Source: Own representation.
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We	will	measure	 the	 different	 sectors’	 openness	 by	 the	 share	 of	 the	 exported	 value	 added	 of	
each	 sector’s	 total	 value	 added.	 This	 has	 a	 decisive	 advantage	 compared	 to	 other	measures	 of	
openness	because	it	allows	indirect	exports	to	also	be	taken	into	consideration.	These	are	created	
when	 sectors	 that	 export	 little	 or	 nothing	 themselves	 deliver	 inputs	 to	 other,	 more	 export-
oriented	 sectors.	 Moreover,	 in	 the	 measure	 used,	 imported	 inputs	 are	 deducted	 because	 they	









We	 consider	 a	 simple	 regression	 model	 for	 our	 analysis.	 The	 central	 challenge	 consisted	 of	
distinguishing	 the	 influence	 of	 openness	 from	 the	 influence	 of	 other	 sectoral	 characteristics.	
As	a	 result,	 besides	 the	variables	of	 interest,	 our	 regression	model	 takes	 the	 following	control	
variables	 into	 account:	 a	 complete	 set	 of	 industry	 indicators	 (to	 isolate	 constant	 heterogeneity	
between	sectors),	a	complete	set	of	annual	 indicators	 (to	 represent	 the	macroeconomic	 trends)	
as	well	as	linear	and	quadratic	sector-specific	time	trends.	This	design	is	intended	to	help	ensure	
that	the	correlations	between	openness	and	inequality	are	not	driven	by	factors	other	than	the	
two	 variables	 of	 interest.	 Unfortunately,	 no	 aggregated	 data	 is	 available	 on	 the	 development	
of	 collective	 bargaining	 agreements	 at	 the	 sectoral	 level,	 so	 we	 cannot	 examine	 it	 directly	 in	
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Figure 18: Inequality and openness over time at the sector level
Source: Own calculations based on the SIAB and WIOD.
Year  Inequality (standard deviation of log of wages), left axis Export share, %, right axis
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Table 6: Inequality and openness at the sector level 
All sectors only PG only DL
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Export openness 0.067** 0.089* 0.084*** 0.115*** 0.085** 0.001
(0.030) (0.050) (0.017) (0.036) (0.034) (0.102)
Export Openness, 2 –0.02 –0.029
(0.03) (0.031)
Import Openness –0.050 –0.138
(0.064) (0.194)
Import Openness, 2 0.082
(0.127)
R2 0.9489 0.9489 0.9495 0.9499 0.9547 0.9512
Root MSE 0.0062 0.0062 0.0062 0.0061 0.0051 0.0068
F-Test
(P-Wert)
0.0264 0.0298 0.1563 0.1055 0.0399 0.0000
Number of 
industries 
34 34 34 34 15 17
Quelle: All regressions consider sector dummies, year dummies and linear and quadratic sector-specific time trends. Standard 
errors are adapted to the industry level. Columns (1)-(8): Number of years 13. PG: manufacturing industries, DL: services. 
***, **, * statistically significant at the one, five or ten percent level.
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Column	 1	 shows	 the	 results	 of	 the	 basic	 specification.	 Here,	 besides	 the	 control	 variables	
mentioned,	 a	 regression	 is	 conducted	 of	 the	 standard	 deviation	 of	 log	 real	 wages	 on	 export	
openness.	 In	so	doing,	we	consider	all	 sectors.	The	effect	of	0.067	 is	statistically	significant	at	
the	 five	 percent	 level.	 This	 suggests	 that	 on	 average	 across	 all	 sectors	 considered	 from	 1998	




































































For	 economic	policy,	 it	 is	 important	 to	put	 our	 results	properly	 in	 context.	We	have	 examined	














The	 central	 economic	 policy	 conclusion	 of	 our	 work	 should	 be	 that	 the	 challenge	 from	 an	

























report	annually,	 for	each	of	his	employees,	 the	exact	 term	of	 the	employment	 relationship	and	
the	total	compensation	paid.	Total	compensation	is	limited	to	the	amount	up	to	the	social	security	
assessment	 cutoff.	However,	 there	are	established	methods	 to	determine	wages	 in	 these	 cases	
as	well	in	sufficient	approximations,	see	Dustmann	et	al.	2009	and	Card	et	al.	2013.	In	addition	
to	 information	on	 the	 length	of	employment	and	compensation	 there	 is	additional	 information,	




on	 the	 fact	 that	 there	 is	no	 information	on	 the	number	of	hours	worked,	 since	 the	number	of	
hours	worked	by	part-time	workers	 can	vary	 substantially.	Marginal	 employment	 relationships	
and	 those	 working	 very	 little	 are	 also	 excluded	 from	 our	 analysis.	 Information	 about	 these	











Companies	 in	 the	 old	 federal	 states	have	been	 surveyed	 since	1993,	 and	 companies	 in	 the	









































































































































Figure A1: Wage Inequality by industry
Source: Own calculations based on SIAB. The underlying sample includes full-time employees from 18 to 65 years old separated by industry. Shown is 
the standard deviation of log real wages by industry. 
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Abbildung A 1: Ungleichheit pro Branche
Source: Own calculations based on SIAB. The underlying sample includes full-time employees from 18 to 65 years old separated by industry. Shown is 
the standard deviation of log real wages by industry. 
Glass, etc. Metal








Abbildung A 1: Ungleichheit pro Branche
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Abbildung A 1: Ungleichheit pro Branche
Source: Own calculations based on SIAB. The underlying sample includes full-time employees from 18 to 65 years old separated by industry. Shown is 
the standard deviation of log real wages by industry. 
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Table A1: Results of the decomposition analysis, 1996–2010
1996–2010
Wage differential 85-15 50-15 85-50 
Measurable change 13.49*** 10.15*** 3.34
(2.17) (1.23) (2.03)
Composition effects
Export status –0.40 –0.36 –0.04
(0.26) (0.23) (0.31)
Collective bargaining 5.77*** 4.98*** 0.79
(1.86) (1.64) (0.61)
Technology –0.04 –0.03 –0.01
(0.08) (0.06) (0.04)
Occupation 1.26 1.16 0.10
(1.24) (0.71) (0.88)
Education 1.33*** 0.70*** 0.63*
(0.44) (0.21) (0.35)
Age 2.75*** 0.83*** 1.92***
(0.48) (0.17) (0.39)
Sector –0.08 –0.33 0.25
(0.38) (0.29) (0.24)
Total effect 10.59*** 6.95*** 3.64***
(2.85) (2.05) (1.29)
Wage structure effect
Export status 1.79 3.87 –2.09
(6.07) (4.89) (3.07)
Collective bargaining 10.96** 10.46** 0.49
(3.95) (3.73) (1.62)
Technology –1.28 –2.10 0.82
(2.8) (2.22) (1.41)
Occupation –3.45 –4.93 1.48
(14.75) (14.34) (4.69)
Education 4.65*** 1.96 2.7***
(1.58) (1.17) (0.84)
Age –5.47* –5.03** –0.44
(2.93) (2.2) (1.65)
Sector –1.52 –1.72 0.20
(16.84) (9.36) (10.6)
Constants –5.78 –2.20 –3.58
(23.18) (16.35) (10.82)
Total effect –0.10 0.31 –0.41
(2.39) (2.28) (0.97)
Weighting error –0.04 –0.12 0.08
(0.71) (0.57) (0.47)
Specification error 3.04* 3.01** 0.03
(1.47) (1.25) (0.87)
Source: LIAB. The underlying sample includes full-time male employees between the ages of 18 to 65 years who are 
employed in the manufacturing sector. Weighting factors are considered. The values in parentheses reflect the standard error. 
***, **, * statistically significant at the one, five or ten percent level.
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Table A2: Results of the decomposition analysis, 1996–2003, 2003–2010 
1996–2003 2003–2010
Wage differential 85-15 85-15 




































Total effect –0.68 3.80**
(1.28) (1.55)
Weighting error –0.29 –0.03
(0.34) (0.20)
Specification error 0.98 –0.31
(0.72) (0.60)
Source: LIAB. The underlying sample includes full-time male employees between the ages of 18 to 65 years who are 
employed in the manufacturing sector. Weighting factors are considered. The values in parentheses reflect the standard error. 
***, **, * statistically significant at the one, five or ten percent level.
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About the Project “Global Economic Dynamics” (GED)
The	 Global	 Economic	 Dynamics	 (GED)	 project	 of	 the	 Bertelsmann	 Foundation	 contributes	 to	
improving	 the	 understanding	 of	 the	 growing	 complexity	 of	 global	 economic	 developments.	 By	
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